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Abstract 
 
In their review article Zentall et al. propose that nonhumans can come to relate stimuli based 
on their physical properties (perceptual concept learning) or the relationship established 
between or among physically related stimuli (relational concept learning). At the same time, 
they draw upon findings from within the animal learning literature in order to argue that 
nonhumans can also derive untrained yet predictable relations between stimuli in the absence 
of direct training (associative concept learning). We are both intrigued and excited by the 
body of work contained in this paper and believe that it may accelerate our understanding of 
animal as well as human cognition in several ways. Nevertheless, a number of important 
questions still need to be addressed before we can conclude that associative concept learning 
in nonhumans is functionally similar to that observed in our own species.  
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Associative Concept Learning, Stimulus Equivalence, and Relational Frame Theory: 
Working out the Similarities and Differences Between Human and Non-Human Behavior 
The question of what makes humans unique has attracted considerable attention 
within the behavioral sciences. Throughout much of the past century it was assumed that 
those learning principles identified in non-humans could stretch to, and account for, much of 
complex human behavior (see Dymond, Roche, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003; Hayes, 1987; 
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). This ‘continuity assumption’ served as an 
‘intellectual rudder’ guiding early work in the field, with researchers focusing pragmatically 
on non-humans in order to identify general learning principles that could predict-and-
influence the actions of our own species. In many respects, this analytic strategy was a 
successful one, yielding concepts that appear to apply equally to humans and non-humans 
alike (e.g., reinforcement, punishment, generalization, discrimination, extinction, recovery 
and habituation). The continuity assumption seemed to hold true.  
However, when researchers turned their attention to those hallmarks of human 
language (and cognition) a number of important findings started to emerge, findings that 
hinted at learning processes or principles that may be unique to, or largely elaborated in, 
some species relative to others. For instance, verbal behavior stubbornly refused to be 
analyzed in direct contingency terms and early attempts to do so (e.g., Skinner, 1957) did not 
yield a progressive program of research. Furthermore, a growing body of work on 
instructional control (or rule-governed behavior) and stimulus equivalence revealed that 
humans consistently respond in ways that differ from their non-humans counterparts (Galizio, 
1979; Sidman, 1971).Thus it seemed as if - at least in some cases - the continuity assumption 
was beginning to crack and strain.      
Fast forward forty years and these species-related differences are still the subject of 
intense controversy and debate (e.g., Lionello-DeNolf, 2009; Kastak, Schusterman & Kastak, 
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2001; Hayes, 1989; Sidman et al., 1982; Urcuioli, 2008). Some researchers have argued that 
the behavioral processes involved in human language are functionally similar to those that are 
involved in human responding on equivalence tasks (Hayes et al., 2001). The key behavioral 
process (known as arbitrarily applicable relational responding; AARR) refers to the capacity 
to relate stimuli in ways that (a) do not depend on the formal properties of the to-be-related 
stimuli and (b) that are controlled by aspects of the context that have been abstracted so that 
they can be arbitrarily applied in a wide variety of ways. For instance, if humans learn that A-
Same-B and that B-Same-C, they will form a number of bi-directional relations between these 
stimuli in the absence of any training or instruction to do so. That is, they will act as if B-
Same-A and C-Same-B (mutual entailment) as well as if A-Same-C and C-Same-A 
(combinatorial entailment). Furthermore, the (psychological) properties of those stimuli will 
also change in-line with the manner in which they were related (known as a transformation of 
function). Thus if an aversive function is established for A by repeatedly pairing it with an 
electric shock, B and C will also acquire aversive properties despite the fact that they were 
never paired with shocks at any point in time (Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & 
Wulfert, 1994). 
Although humans appear to learn AARR early on in their development, existing 
evidence for mutual and combinatorial entailment has been difficult to find in other species 
such as pigeons (Lionello-DeNolf, & Urcuioli, 2002), chimpanzees, and baboons (Dugdale & 
Lowe, 2000, Hayes, 1989; Sidman et al., 1982). Indeed, studies demonstrate that even after 
extensive training non-humans find it difficult to demonstrate the simplest form of AARR 
(i.e., symmetry or mutual entailment). Moreover, in those cases where positive evidence has 
been obtained for symmetry responding, test performances can be explained in ways that (a) 
do not involve AARR, (b) are only present in a small sub-section of the sample, or (c) are 
emitted with unacceptably low levels of accuracy (Lionello-DeNolf, 2009). Nevertheless, 
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more recent papers (including the target article) argue that these failures to observe AARR in 
animals stem from properties of the test procedures themselves and non-humans are capable 
of AARR under a set of highly specific conditions.  
The basic argument is that non-humans cannot only relate stimuli based on their 
physical properties (perceptual concept learning) or as a function of the relationship 
established between or among physically related stimuli (relational concept learning), but 
also derive relations that were never directly trained or instructed in the past (associative 
concept learning). In this latter case, the organism is argued to relate stimuli in ways that do 
not depend on their physical properties and in such a way that these stimuli come to be 
functionally interchangeable with one another (i.e., respond in an arbitrarily applicable 
fashion). These performances are argued to mirror those observed in humans - and by 
implication - reflect a learning process that stretches across the species divide. This claim is 
backed by recent findings from within the animal learning literature on acquired equivalence 
and symmetry responding, in which nonhumans purportedly relate stimuli in untrained yet 
predictable ways.  
Overall, we are both intrigued and excited by the body of work contained in this 
review and believe that it may accelerate our understanding of animal as well as human 
cognition in several ways. Before continuing, however, it is important to recognize that these 
empirical developments are not incompatible or inconsistent with Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT). Actually it’s quite the opposite. Almost 20 years ago, Barnes and Roche (1996) wrote: 
RFT recognizes that very limited forms of derived behavior may occur without a 
history of explicitly reinforced equivalence responding (see Hayes & Wilson, 1993; 
see also Zentall and Urcuoli, 1993, for evidence that suggests derived behavior may 
occur in nonhumans). Nevertheless, these types of behavior are normally defined as 
largely respondent because they do not emerge from an appropriate history of 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding (note, this is a purely functional 
distinction). Respondent behavior is, however, considered to be an important 
foundation for relational framing (see Barnes, 1994, for a detailed discussion of this 
issue in terms of indirect reflexivity) (p. 501). 
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It is also interesting to note, that in that same article Barnes and Roche presented some 
speculative RFT-based analyses concerning the relationship between identity matching (or 
reflexivity) and derived symmetry responding, concluding that the “issue will clearly require 
some very precise and delicate analyses by those researchers who specialize in nonhuman 
stimulus control” (p. 502). The empirical work that is reviewed in the current target article 
provides, in our view, some of the finest examples of the very research that Barnes and Roche 
called for back in the mid-1990s. 
Despite these positives, we believe that an argument for AARR in non-humans 
currently faces a number of challenges. We know that AARR is characterized (at least in 
humans) by its flexibility. For instance, humans can respond to stimuli as if they are 
equivalent or symmetrically related based on verbal instructions (Smeets, Dymond & Barnes-
Holmes, 2000), conditional discrimination tasks (Dougher et al., 1994) and respondent-like 
training procedures (Leader & Barnes-Holmes, 2001). Equivalence (and other derived 
relations) also emerge regardless of whether a Many-to-One (MTO), One-To-Many (OTM) 
or linear training and testing design is employed (i.e., where A is related to B and B related to 
C; Arntzen, Grondahl, & Eilifsen, 2010; Arntzen & Holth, 1997). No strict temporal or 
spatial ordering between the sample and comparison stimuli must be implemented nor is 
concurrent identity or successive matching training a perquisite in order to observe these 
effects in verbal humans. 
If Zentall et al. are correct, and non-humans are capable of AARR in the same way as 
their human counterparts, then they appear to be restricted to the most rudimentary features 
of that behavior, which emerge only under the strictest of experimental conditions. The work 
highlighted in their review suggests that symmetry may depend on successive matching in 
which the sample and comparison stimuli are presented one after the other in the same 
location (and close in time). This seems to differ functionally from the symmetry 
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performances observed in humans that emerge regardless of the training protocol used. 
Likewise, the difficulty of observing equivalence performances on OTM (and perhaps even 
linear training and testing designs) also differs from comparable performances in humans 
(Arntzen et al., 2010). When taken together, the reviewed research does not (convincingly) 
demonstrate the flexibility that is characteristic of AARR in our own species. 
It also seems important to acknowledge that humans are not shackled to associative 
concept learning (or relating stimuli on the basis of equivalence) in their interactions with the 
environment but can instead behave as if stimuli are related to one another in many different 
ways. Indeed, findings indicate that this ability to respond in an arbitrarily applicable fashion 
enables humans to relate stimuli as opposite (Dymond, Roche, Forsyth, Whelan & Rhoden, 
2008), hierarchically (Gil, Luciano, Ruiz & Valdivia-Salas, 2012), comparatively (Vitale, 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes & Campbell, 2008), deictically (McHugh & Stewart, 2012), 
temporally and/or causally (O’Hora et al., 2008) related (see Dymond & Roche, 2013, for a 
recent review). This work also suggests that when non-equivalence relations are involved, 
stimulus functions are not simply transferred but rather transformed through those relations in 
non-equivalent ways. For instance, if humans learn that A-Opposite-B-Same-C and A-
Opposite-Shock they may come to approach A and avoid B or C (Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 
2004). 
Thus, while equivalence appears to be one of the first types of derived relations to 
emerge in a human infant’s  repertoire (Luciano, Gomez-Becerra, & Rodriguez-Valverde, 
2007), other relations play a defining role in how we adapt to the world around us. Deictic 
relations (“I-You/ Here-There/ Now-Then”) seem to dominate many self and perspective 
taking behaviors (McHugh & Stewart, 2012) while temporality and causality may be central 
to many rule-governed behaviors (Torneke et al., 2008). Even classification or categorization 
itself can involve stimuli that are hierarchically related in non-equivalent ways. For example, 
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within the superordinate category ‘foods’ there may be classes of stimuli that are related on 
the basis of opposition (‘poisonous vs. non-poisonous foods’), comparison (‘cheap vs. 
expensive foods’), deictics (‘foods I like vs. don’t like’) or difference (‘meat vs. vegetables). 
Developing an account of the relational responses involved in these types of complex 
categorization abilities, in terms of associative concept learning (equivalence) alone, will 
certainly be very challenging (see Dymond & Barnes, 1995, for an empirical example of 
AARR responding in accordance with just two relational frames -- same and comparison -- 
which proved difficult to explain in terms of equivalence responding). 
Despite these challenges, however, we must emphasize again that we are genuinely 
excited and intrigued by the work presented in the target article. Although a number of 
important questions still need to be addressed before we can conclude AARR in nonhumans 
is functionally similar to that observed in our own species, we nevertheless believe that the 
research outlined here represents a golden opportunity to develop much needed dialogue 
between animal and human learning researchers on issues that are central to both traditions. 
Importantly, this dialogue is not a one-way street: the lessons learned in human research may 
stimulate developments in the animal literature and vice-versa. For instance, research on 
animal cognition may provide new insights into human cognition by identifying how basic 
forms of (respondent) learning are selected, modified, strengthened and elaborated by the 
(verbal) operant contingencies that RFT argues are crucial for the emergence of increasingly 
complex forms of AARR. Animal preparations and populations may also allow us to examine 
questions about AARR that cannot be tackled with humans for ethical and practical reasons. 
In particular, the research considered in the target article could help us understand how young 
infants might transition from very basic to more complex forms of AARR. 
Recent work on human cognition could also unlock new insights into animal learning. 
It may well be that there is some level of relational complexity, contextual control or 
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generalizability that humans are capable of that is not seen elsewhere in the animal kingdom. 
For instance, to what degree are other species restricted to equivalence (or associative 
concept) learning and can they respond to stimuli as opposite, more than/less than, 
hierarchically, temporally or casually related in an arbitrarily applicable fashion? Can they 
relate entire equivalence relations to other equivalence relations and form increasingly 
complex networks of stimulus relations (e.g., Barnes, Hegarty, & Smeets, 1997)? If so, then 
what implications does this have for our understanding of animal cognition, reasoning and 
creativity? What type, amount and order of training are required before relational responding 
becomes abstracted and generalizes to novel stimuli? Is it the case that this advanced type of 
relational learning stretches across many different evolutionary branches or is it unique to a 
small number of species? Again, if so, then why? Are there certain environmental or 
evolutionary conditions necessary in order to observe the emergence of complex forms of 
AARR (e.g., Hayes & Long, 2013; Smet & Byrne, in press)? Chasing these (and related) 
issues will not only lead to a better understanding of human and animal cognition but also 
identify important lines of fracture between and among species. The work presented by 
Zentall et al. already draws attention to potential lines of fracture between human and non-
human behavior in terms of the restricted set of conditions under which non-human 
equivalence responding is seen to emerge. We look forward to increased collaboration and 
communication between animal learning and RFT researchers as we continue to explore the 
commonalities that bind, and the differences that separate, humans from other species in the 
animal kingdom. 
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